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was not final; moreover, no vested rights were created in the appellant
since the decree was subject to future modification in the court's
discretion.16
Respondent sought to have future alimony payments forfeited.
-"The misconduct for which the forfeiture of alimony was . . . imposed was misconduct after the date of the statute,17 and the alimony
payments forfeited were those which were to come due in the future.
In no real sense can such a use of the statute be considered to be
retrospective."18
The court had power to modify the alimony provisions; 19 the action was pending;20 the legislature had determined grounds for the
court's acting; 2 1 appellant was included under the legislative determination;22 therefore, it is submitted that it was within the court's
discretion to have considered the annulment of alimony under the
divorce decree of 1928 as to those payments which were to come due
2
after the 1938 statute2 3 became effective. 4

MILITARY SERVICE
REGISTRANT'S DUTY TO INFORM SELECTIVE SERVICE
BOARD OF HIS MAILING ADDRESS
Petitioner, a Houston, Texas, registrant under the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940,1 was classified 1-A by his local board,
which advised him that he would be inducted in twenty or thirty days.
With this knowledge, petitioner became a merchant seaman for a
short trip to New York City, leaving word with the National Maritime Union's Houston office to forward his mail to its New York
office. The local board was also advised of the registrant's shipping,
and was requested to send his induction notice to the union's Houston
office. This notice was mailed and forwarded to the New York City Office, but petitioner, who had meanwhile signed on for a foreign voyage from New York City, never received the notice although he was
in New York harbor and had received assurances from the union's
executive officer that he would be contacted when the notice arrived.
Petitioner was convicted in a federal district court for a knowing
failure to keep his draft board advised of the address where mail
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
1.

See Judge Desmond, dissenting in the instant case at 12; also
see note 9 supra.
March 26, 1938.
See Judge Desmond, dissenting in the instant case at 12, 13.
See note 14 supra.
Fox v. Fox, 263 N.Y. 68, 70, 188 N.E. 160, 161 (1933).
N.Y. Civil Practice Act §1172-c; see note 1 supra.
See notes 1 and 6 supra.
See note 21 supra.
See note 17 supra.
54 Stat. 885 (1940), 50 U.S.C.A. §301 et seq. (Supp. 1943).
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would reach him.2 On appeal, judgment was affirmed.8 Held, reversed.
Petitioner had sufficiently complied with the pertinent regulation when
he, in good faith, provided a chain of forwarding addresses so that
mail sent to the address given the local board would be reasonably
expected to be received in time for compliance. Bartchy v. United
States, 319 U.S. 484 (1943).
(Mr. Chief Justice Stone and Justice
Roberts dissenting).
This decision is the first which construes the regulation in question.
To carry out the provisions of the 1940 act, to facilitate uniformity, and to advise local boards of procedures to be followed, the President was authorized- to promulgate rules and regulationE. It was held
under the Selective Draft Act of 19175 that the rules and regulations
prescribed thereunder had the force and effect of law.6 That this is,
in effect, true under the 1940 act is borne out by the decision in
Zuziak v. United States.7
Petitioner and all other registrants have notice of the act and
regulations made pursuant to it;8 obviously, actual knowledge
is unnecessary. Such a regulation 9 is involved in the principal case.
The majority opinion, however, qualified the regulation to the extent
that the registrant, with knowledge of his duty, was not required at
his peril to inquire at short intervals at the last address given the
local board or at the forwarding address for mail from hi3 local board.1o
2.

32 C.F.R., 1941 Supp., §641.3 which states: "Communication by
Mail. It shall be the duty of each registrant to keep his local
board advised at all times of the address where mail will reach
him. The mailing of any order, notice, or blank form by the
local board to a registrant at the address last reported by him
to the local board shall constitute notice to him of the contents
of the communication, whether he actually receives it or not."
Under a similar regulation made pursuant to the 1917 act, it was
held that if the paper was not mailed to the address given the
local board by the registrant, constructive notice would not be
given. Allen v. Timm et al., 1 F. (2d) 155, 157 (C.C.A. 7th, 1924);
Ex parte Goldstein, 268 Fed. 431, 432 (D. Mass. 1920).
3. Bartchy v. United States, 132 F. (2d) 348 (C.C.A, 5th, 1942).
4. 54 Stat. 885, 893 (1940), 50 U.S.C.A. §310(a) (Supp. 1943).
5. 40 Stat. 76 (1917), as amended, 40 Stat. 534 (1918), id. at 885,
id. at 955, 50 U.S.C.A. §201 et seq. (Supp. 1943).
6. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918); United States
ex rel. Feld v. Bullard, 290 Fed. 704, 708 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1923); Angelus v. Sullivan et al., 246 Fed. 54, 60 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1917).
7. 119 F. (2d) 140 (C.C.A. 9th, 1941). The court also said that it
would take judicial notice of the issuance of the rules and regulations. Moreover, the courts will give similar effect to subsequent regulations as they are published.
8. 32 C.F.R., 1941 Supp., §641.1 which recites: "Notice of Requirements of Selective Service Law. Every person shall be deemed
to have notice of the requirements of the Selective Training and
Service Act of 1940 and amendments thereto upon publication by
the President of a proclamation or proclamations or other public
notice fixing a time for any registration. This provision shall
apply not only to registrants but to all other persons."
9. See note 2 supra.
10. Instant case at 489.
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The Court relieved the petitioner from this onerous burden 1 on the
ground that he had established a direct channel by which he would
have received the induction notice had not the New York union official
mistakenly decided that the ship, on which the petitioner was a seaman, had sailed. That the dissenting judges would impose a strict
liability on the registrant seemed paramount from their opinion. 2
Neither opinion questioned whether or not the New York union
executive was or could have been the petitioner's agent to receive notice; had this been established the result might well have been different.
In United States v. Wheeler, 1" the court maintained that registrants were not required either under the 1917 act or regulations to
remain in their permanent homes or actual places of residence until
drafted; the location of the registrant other than his permanent home
was contemplated, and his absence from home in to manner prejudiced
his rights either under the act or the regulations.
As the petitioner was convicted for a knowing failure to act
under the penalty provision of the 1940 act,' 4 his "mens rea" became important. The fact that he in good faith established a continuous belt
of addresses which would contact him if properly carried out should
rebut a contention of a "knowing failure to act."' 5
The Supreme Court granted certiorari " . . . because the con-

viction involved an interpretation of an important regulation under
the Selective Service Act."' 6 It is submitted that the court arrived
at a just and proper interpretation, one which takes little from the
administrative boards yet adds much to the freedom of the registrants'
actions.
11.

The Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 states in part (b)

of the declaration as its fundamental purpose that " . . . military . . . service should be shared generally in accordance with

12.
13.
14.

15.

16.

a fair and just system of selective compulsory military training
and service." 54 Stat. 885 (1940), 50 U.S.C.A. §301(b) (Supp.
1943). In Rome v. Marsh, Commandant, etc., 272 Fed. 982, 985
(D. Mass. 1920), the court asserted that it was the duty of administrative boards, such as local boards, to protect the rights
of individual citizens as well as the rights of the government.
Statements as these are, at the outset, indicative that the duty
implanted on the petitioner by the dissenting judges and the
courts below is unjust, and that the qualified duty imposed by
the majority opinion is much more desirable.
Instant case at 490.
United States v. Wheeler et al., 254 Fed. 611, 615 (D. Ariz. 1918),
aff'd, 254 U.S. 281 (1920).
54 Stat. 885, 894 (1940), 50 U.S.C.A. §311 (Supp. 1943), provides
punishment with a maximum of five years imprisonment andlor
a fine of not more than $10,000 to "any persons . . . who in any
manner shall knowingly fail or neglect to perform any duty required of him under or in the execution of this Act, or rules or
regulations made pursuant to this Act. .... "
Judge Hutcheson, dissenting in the principal case below, gave
considerable weight to the fact that Bartchy voluntarily offered
to perform dangerous services in the merchant marine; this fact,
the judge contended, demonstrated the petitioner's mental attitude
and absolved him of a wilful evasion of duty. Bartchy v. United
States, 132 F. (2d) 348, 352 (C.C.A. 5th, 1942).
Instant case at 485.

